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1 Introduction
Voting determines a large number of collective decisions. As a major expression of a
systems democracy, the design of voting institutions should account, among other
things, for citizenspreferences regarding the threshold required in order to deter-
mine the winning majority. We argue that peoples preferences for a given majority
threshold depend on their attitudes towards risk. In this paper, we experimentally
test a theoretical framework aimed at modelling individual risk attitudes as a factor
that should be taken into account in the design of voting institutions, and especially
in the determination of majority thresholds.
An agent knows that future common decisions will be made by voting. Those
decisions may be favorable or unfavorable to her, but she does not know how others
will vote. Voting becomes a lottery: there is a chance that a favorable majority will
form, but also a risk to be tyrannized by an unfavorable majority. The expected
value of this lottery crucially depends on the voting rules: for example, less decisive
voting rules, such as a high super-majority, reduce the tyranny risk but also the
chance to get a favorable outcome. Intuitively, a risk averse agent is more sensitive
to the prospect of falling into a minority than to the chance of ending up into a
majority. We expect preference for higher super-majorities and less decisive rules
from more risk averse agents, and vice versa.
Simple majority is less frequent in the real world, than it may appear. Most coun-
tries have de facto super-majority requirements because of bicameral legislatures: it
is not easy to undo the status-quo if a bill has to pass a two-house majority. Leg-
islation processes are often subject to executive vetoes or other forms of check and
balances. International agreements usually require unanimity (WTO), veto power
(the UN Security Council), or high super-majorities (the Council of the EU). When
corporate boards vote on major actions (mergers and acquisitions, major capital
expansions, etc.), high super-majorities are generally required. We claim that this
extensive use of super-majorities de facto reects a general aversion towards the risk
of being tyrannized. In many cases, the trade-o¤between protection and decisiveness
is solved in favor of protection.
We add a further dimension to our analysis: the agents priors about how others
will vote. The simple intuition is that when an agent thinks of herself as substantially
di¤erent from the others, then she thinks that the others are less likely to vote like
her; thus she assigns a higher probability to the event of being tyrannized. Given
her risk attitudes, she demands for stronger protection: i.e., for a higher threshold.
With this dimension, we explore how preferences for voting rules depend either on
exogenous psychological attitudes, such as subjective condence, or on the rational
2
use of information about the policy preferences of other people.
Reality shows that those who think of themselves as di¤erent from the majority
ask for more protectionist rules. This is the case of ethnic minorities, that are usually
protected by constitutional provisions that cannot be undone by the majority. In the
EU, members may always invoke a conditional veto power when decisions concern
their crucial interests (the so-called Luxemburg compromise).
We support theoretical predictions with experimental data. We nd a positive
and signicant correlation between the majority threshold chosen by an agent and her
degree of risk aversion as measured by standard experimental techniques. Moreover,
agents preferred majority threshold is negatively and signicantly correlated with
her subjective over-condence. However, when agents can observe a private signal on
the distribution of voterspreferences over the policies to vote, we nd that preferred
majority thresholds are fully determined by the signal, rather than their naive priors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we relate our paper
to the existing literature on public choice. In section 3 we describe our experimental
design. Section 4 draws the main theoretical predictions to test. In section 5, we
present experimental results and section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In order to focus on risk attitudes, voting is presented as a lottery where uncertainty
derives from ignorance about how others will vote. Thus the outcome risk can be
controlled by setting up an appropriate majority threshold.
The idea that the preferences for voting rules reect the uncertainty about the
voting outcome and risk aversion is not new in the literature. Rae (1969) focuses on
the uncertainty related to gains or losses generated from the making of a law. He
suggests that the bare majority is the only rule that minimizes the expected cost of
being part of the minority. This result is formally proved in Taylor (1969). In fact,
Raes result applies to voting contests in which costs and gains are equal and also
equally likely to arise from a bill that is opposed to the status quo. Attanasi, Corazz-
ini and Passarelli (2009) extend Raes (1969) setting to a wider range of situations.
The most preferred voting rule optimizes the trade-o¤ between the risk of ending up
into an unfavorable minority and the chance to be part of the majority. Of course,
risk aversion implies stronger preference for more conservative rules. This tendency
to protect from the risk of bad policy decisions is the same reason why in Aghion,
Alesina and Trebbi (2004) a representative agent prefers a lower degree of insulation
of political leaders. The authors do not specically consider qualied majorities, but
it is easy to see that an Executive is less insulated when a higher super-majority is
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required to pass laws in the Parliament. The optimal degree of insulation depends on
the cost of compensating the losers, uncertainty about gains and losses, the degree
of risk aversion. In Aghion and Bolton (2002) risk derives from ex-ante ignorance
about losses or gains from the provision of a public good. In this scenario, if the
expected cost of compensating the losing minority raises, then agents prefer a higher
qualied majority threshold.
We claim here that an individual who is more optimistic about how the others will
vote perceives a lower risk of tyranny. As a consequence, she prefers more decisive
voting rules. This relationship between condence and preferences for voting rules is
new in the literature. So far condence has been directly related to voting preferences
rather than to the preferences for voting rules. Seminal papers are Buchanan and
Faith (1980,1981) and Zorn and Martin (1986).
In our experimental setting, uncertainty originates from the random assignment
of subjects favorite alternatives. To the best of our knowledge, there are no ex-
perimental works analyzing the choice of majority thresholds at the individual level
and relating them to risk aversion and condence. The experimental literature has
paid much more attention to strategic voting, as a situation that arises due to the
tension between an individual voters true preferences and the expected e¤ect of a
vote on the nal outcome. Specically, the studies by Fiorina and Plott (1978) and
Plott (1991) report experimental results supporting the notion of the core. On the
contrary, voting through truthful revelation of voterspreferences has received little,
if any, attention because of researcherslack of interest in the apparently trivial situ-
ation in which a voter simply translates her preference into an actual vote. However,
our paper shows that truthful voting may still be a fruitful area of research, in the
framework of which we can study voterspreferences over di¤erent voting institu-
tions. A number of experimental studies have paid attention to the role of majority
rules (Fiorina and Plott (1978)) and other alternatives like Borda rule, approval vot-
ing (Forsythe et al. (1996)) and unanimity (Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey
(2000)) on the observed outcomes. Recently, some experiments have been conducted,
such as Hortala-Vallve (2004) and Casella et al. (2006, 2008), which explore the be-
havior of laboratory committees using novel voting methods that allow members to
express strength of preference. However, in all these papers the majority rule is ex-
ogenously imposed by the experimenter while the focus of the studies is on the voting
outcomes obtained. Therefore, the emergence of di¤erent voting institutions as the
result of agentspreferences over them remains unexplored. Furthermore, as we argue
in this paper, it is anything but trivial to investigate some of the sources of a voters
preference for a particular majority threshold. Rather than exogenously imposing
the threshold as an invariant political institution, we consider voters with di¤erent
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idiosyncratic features which may give rise to di¤erent preferences for a higher or a
lower majority threshold in a given voting process.
Following the insights of our theoretical model, we relate the subjects preferred
majority threshold to her subjective degree of risk aversion. We also relate the
majority threshold chosen by the subject to her belief about the distribution of votes
exogenously assigned to the other voters. Therefore, the kind of condencewe
are interested in is the one that an agent shows when being asked to evaluate the
probability of a random policy outcome, that can get her a gain, a loss, or the status
quo. Empirical studies in behavioral nance do not nd clear-cut evidence that over-
condent investors actually do take more risks (see e.g. Dorn and Huberman (2005)
and Menkho¤ et al. (2006)). Interestingly, experimental literature has shown that
individuals seem to be both overly optimistic about future outcomes and prone to
overcondence (see e.g. Lichtenstein et al. (1982)) and that these biases can lead to
distortions in risk taking behavior. In our experiment, we elicit a subjects condence
(uncondence) in two di¤erent situations. In one treatment, subjects are asked to
state their beliefs about the exogenous distribution of votes over two alternatives.
In this treatment they only know that the probability for each subjects vote to be
assigned to either one or the other of the two alternatives is the same. In another
treatment, we ask the subjects the same question, after having let them observe a
private signal about the votes distribution. Thus, we can estimate the e¤ects of
exit polls and pre-voting information on both subjectsbeliefs and their preferred
threshold. Existing literature has shown that exit polls and pre-voting information
a¤ect voting behavior (see e.g. Blais and Bodet (2006), McAllister and Studlar
(1991), Sudman (1986)). We check whether and, if so, in which way, pre-voting
information a¤ects the preferred threshold.
3 The Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of two treatments, the NO-INFO and the INFO treatment.
In the NO-INFO treatment, subjects participated to two consecutive phases.1 Only
one of the two phases was used to determine subjectsnal payo¤. In particular,
at the end of the session, we randomly selected the phase to pay by ipping a coin.
Instructions were distributed and read aloud at the beginning of each phase. In the
rst phase, subjects participated to a variant of the Holt and Laurys mechanism
to elicit agentsrisk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002). Subjects were presented with
a battery of 19 pairs of lotteries numbered from (line) L1 to (line) L19 and a last
1An English version of the instructions is provided in the Appendix.
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(empty) line L20. Each pair described two lotteries called A and B. Each lottery
presented two possible monetary outcomes, a favorable and an unfavorable outcome,
as well as their attached probabilities. Probabilities were framed by means of an
urn that contained twenty tickets, numbered from 1 to 20. The structure of the
battery had two main characteristics. First, within each pair, lottery A and lottery
B had the same probability structure but di¤erent monetary outcomes. In particular,
the favorable and the unfavorable outcome of lottery A were 12:00 and 10:00 euros
respectively, while they were set to 22:00 and 0:50 euros for lottery B. Second, across
pairs, while we kept constant the monetary outcomes of the corresponding lotteries,
we varied the probabilities of the favorable and unfavorable outcomes. In particular,
while in L1 the probabilities of the favorable and unfavorable outcome where 1=20
and 19=20 respectively, they were gradually and monotonically changed across pairs
in such a way that in L19 they ended up with 19=20 and 1=20 respectively. Given
the battery, each subject was asked to choose the line (pair of lotteries) starting
from which she preferred lottery B to lottery A. Thus, for all the pairs of lotteries
above her choice, a subject preferred lottery A to lottery B, while starting from
the pair on the chosen line and for all the pairs below, she preferred lottery B to
lottery A. A subject preferring lottery A to lottery B for all the 19 pairs selected the
last (empty) line L20. Participants knew that, if the rst phase of the experiment
was selected to determine their nal earnings, the computer would randomly select
a pair of lotteries for each participant. Given her choice and according to the pair
selected by the computer, each subject participated to the preferred lottery. Then,
an experimenter randomly drew one of the twenty tickets contained in the urn. The
ticket drawn by the experimenter was used to determine the outcome of the preferred
lottery and the corresponding payo¤.
We will use subjects choice in the rst phase of the experiment as a proxy
of her degree of risk aversion. Given the structure of the battery, the higher the
number of the line chosen by the subject, the higher her degree of risk aversion. Note
that, di¤erently from the original setting proposed by Holt and Laury (2002), in our
experiment we imposed consistency. Indeed, rather than o¤ering further evidence on
(in-)consistency of risk preferences, in this paper we are interested in measuring the
correlation between risk aversion and the preferred majority threshold.2
The second phase of the experiment consisted of two consecutive parts. Again, the
instructions of each decisional task were distributed and read aloud at the beginning
of each part. In the rst part of the second phase, each subject was asked to choose
a majority threshold included between the simple majority and the unanimity, that
2Andersen et al. (2006) use a similar mechanism. See Dohmen et al. (2010) for an alternative
design that imposes consistency.
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she wanted to apply in a voting procedure between two alternatives, X and Y . At
the beginning of the phase, the computer randomly assigned to each subject and
with equal probability one of two types, x or y. Given her type, the vote of each
subject was automatically assigned by the computer to the corresponding alternative,
such that x type voters supported alternative X while y type voters supported
alternative Y . Subjects were informed that, in case at the end of the experiment the
second phase was selected to be paid, the payo¤ of each subject from the rst part
was determined by comparing her preferred majority threshold with the distribution
of x type voters and y type voters in that session. In particular, if the majority
threshold stated by a subject was equal to or smaller than the number of subjects of
her own type, then she earned 22:00 euros; while, if it was equal to or smaller than
the number of subjects of the other type, she earned nothing. Finally, if neither the
number of subjects of her own type nor that of the other type were greater than or
equal to her stated majority threshold, then the subject earned 11:00 euros. In the
second part of the second phase, each subject was asked to guess the distribution of
x type and y type voters in that session. If the second phase was selected to be
paid and her guess was correct, then 3:00 euros were added to the subjects earnings
from the rst part of this phase.
The only di¤erence between the NO-INFO and the INFO treatment was that in
the latter, at the beginning of the second phase, each subject privately observed a
signal about the distribution of x type and y type voters in that session. In partic-
ular, for each subject the computer randomly selected a subset of seven participants.
Then, each subject was presented with the distribution of x type and y type voters
in the correspondent subset. After that, each subject was asked to choose a majority
threshold (part 1) and to guess the distribution of x type and y type voters in that
session (part 2), as in the NO-INFO treatment.
4 Theory
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model in which the majority threshold
preferred by an agent depends on her degree of risk aversion and her priors about
how others will vote.
In political choices, the agent faces a certain amount of risk if she does not know
how others will vote. Consider agent j. Her voting prospect can be represented as
a non degenerated lottery in the following way. Let N = f1; :::; n; jg be the set of
n + 1 agents who play a majority voting game where q is the majority threshold
and agents have one vote each. Thus the sum of votes is n + 1. Assume that the
threshold must be at least the simple majority.
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Let uj(:) be js utility function. The argument of uj is a policy outcome. Assume
that two alternative policy reforms, W and L, are opposed one to another within a
legislature. Either reform passes only if it reaches the required majority threshold.3
From js perspective, W is better than the status quo, and L is worse: uj(W ) >
uj(S) > uj(L). We say that j wins if her most preferred policy alternative, W ,
reaches the required majority in voting. Agent j loseswhen this happens for the
least preferred alternative, L. The status quo S remains if no alternative reaches the
required majority threshold. In other words, agent j wins only if, in addition to her,
a coalition TW that commands at least q   1 votes forms. She loses if an adverse
coalition TL of voters that favor L collects at least q votes. We are interested in the
probability that either TW , or TL or no winning coalition form, and in how these
chances depend on the majority threshold.
Let us assume that agent j thinks that any other agent i (where i = 1; ::; n) will
cast her vote in favor of W with subjective probability p, and will vote for L with
probability (1  p).4 One may say that p captures js degree of condence regarding
how the other n agents will vote. Thus, the othersvotes behave as n independent
random variables, Z, where Z = 1 with probability p, and Z = 0 with probability
(1  p). As a consequence, the probability of forming TW is given by the probability
that the sum of those variables is at least q   1. If we assume that the number of
agents is su¢ ciently large so that the Central Limit Theorem applies, the sum of
votes gotten by TW is distributed like a normal with parameters W = n  p and
2W = np(1  p).5 Let fW (:) be its density function, and call Pr fWg the probability
of winning (i.e. the probability of TW forming); thus,
Pr fWg =
nZ
q 1
fW (x)dx: (1)
Conversely, js subjective probability of falling into the minority (the probability
that TL forms) is
3The reader may also think that W and L are two platforms proposed by two opposing candi-
dates. The candidate who wins the electoral competition will be able to implement her platform
only if she gets a su¢ ciently high majority, that will ensure her the support of the Parliament.
4To save notation, we do not index js subjective probability p by j. The reader should keep in
mind that p and all other variables that depend on p are conditional to j.
5We apply here the Central Limit Theorem in order to prot from the simplicity of a continuous
distribution. For smaller numbers, a similar model can be easily built with a discrete binomial
distribution. The main ndings remain valid.
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Pr fLg =
nZ
q
fL(x)dx (2)
where fL(:) is a normal density function with parameters: L = n  (1   p), and
2L = 
2
W = 
2. An illustration of possible fW (:) and fL(:) is given in gure 1 below.
Finally, js subjective probability that the status quo prevails (the probability
that neither TW nor TL reach the required majority) is
Pr fSg = 1  Pr fWg   Pr fLg (3)
Thus, from agent js viewpoint, voting can be described as a lottery with three
possible outcomes and attached subjective probabilities, as dened in (1-3); i.e. as
 = (W;Pr fWg ;L;Pr fLg ;S;Pr fSg) :
Observe that all probabilities in  depend, among other things, on the majority
threshold, q. For example, with the simple majority, Pr fSg is close to zero, whereas
with unanimity, the status quo is almostcertain. Thus, agent js expected utility
from the voting lottery
EUj() = Pr fWg  uj(W ) + Pr fLg  uj(L) + Pr fSg  uj(S) (4)
depends on the majority threshold q. Call q the threshold that maximizes EUj. Be-
low, we show that q is positively related to js degree of risk aversion, and negatively
related to her degree of condence.
The rst-order condition (FOC) on (4) for a stationary point q0 is
@EUj()
@q

q0
= 0() fW (q0   1)  [uj(W )  uj(S)] = fW (q0)  [uj(S)  uj(L)] (5)
From (5) it is clear that the agent balances the marginal impact of q on the
expected benet of belonging to the majority with the marginal impact of q on the
expected loss of falling into the minority. Solving (5) yields the unique stationary
point:
q0 =
n+ 1
2
+
2 lnRj
1 + W   L
(6)
where
Rj =
uj(S)  uj(L)
uj(W )  uj(S) (7)
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Call Rj in (7) the ratio between agent js benets of not being tyrannized by an
undesired majority, uj(S)  uj(L), and her benets of being part of a favorable win-
ning majority, uj(W )  uj(S). Basically, Rj is positively related to js risk aversion.
The idea is that, for given policy outcomes, W , L and S, a more risk averse agent
weightsthe advantage of avoiding the tyranny of an adverse majority (the numera-
tor) more than the advantage of being part of a favorable majority (the denominator).
We will come back to this point below.
From the second-order condition (SOC) of EUj maximization, it follows that q0
is a maximum if:
1 + W   L > 0 (8)
Observe that (8) implies that, for any q, a favorable majority is always more likely
than an unfavorable one; i.e. Pr fWg > Pr fLg. In this situation, therefore, if
the majority threshold is too high, lowering it may be advantageous because the
expected utility of winning increases more than the expected disutility of losing. If
the threshold is too low, raising it may be advantageous for the opposite reason.
Let us consider now what happens in the case (8) is satised. Then we will look
at the case in which it is not.
Case 1: (8) holds
Notice that (8) holds if and only if p > 0:5 , with ! 0+, given that we assume
that the number of agents is su¢ ciently large. Therefore, agent j is condentthat
the probability of a favorable majority is always higher than an unfavorable one. It
is easy to see that in this case the maximum q0 is larger than 1
2
if Rj > 1. This
means that the agent prefers either a super-majority or unanimity, i.e. q 2  1
2
; 1

,
if the gains of winning (uj(W )   uj(S)) are lower than the gains from not losing
(uj(S) uj(L)). The intuition is clear: if j has little advantages in winning, compared
to the disadvantage of losing, she tends to protect herself with a super-majority. To
some extent, the positive prospect that winning is more likely than losing is mitigated
by the higher cost of falling into a minority. She somehow fears to be tyrannized,
then she prefers a super-majority. If Rj  1, the agent has two good perspectives
from voting: on the one hand, winning is always more likely; on the other hand,
losing is (weakly) less costly than winning. In this case, she wants to increase the
chance of winning by choosing a low threshold, even though this will also increase
the chance of losing. Therefore, q0  1
2
, and the preferred threshold q is constrained
to be the bare majority.
Case 2: (8) does not hold
Notice that (8) does not hold if and only if p < 0:5   , with  ! 0+, given
that we assume that the number of agents is su¢ ciently large. Therefore, agent j
is uncondent, in the sense specied above. In this case, q0 is the minimum of
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EUj. Thus, the preferred threshold q is either unanimity or the simple majority.
It is however possible to say something else about the preferred threshold. Observe
that if Rj  1, q0 in (6) is lower than 12 ; in other words, EUj reaches a minimum
below the simple majority. In this case, the preferred threshold q is unanimity. The
intuition is clear: since (8) does not hold, winning is always less likely than losing;
moreover, Rj  1 implies that losing is relatively more costly than winning. The
voting lottery presents a double disadvantage: tyranny is highly likely and highly
costly. This is the worst situation; thus, not surprisingly, the agent prefers the highest
protection from the risk of being tyrannized. This kind of protection is provided by
unanimity. If Rj < 1, winning is relatively more attractive than losing. In this case,
the agent might prefer a simple majority to unanimity, despite winning is always less
likely. Intuitively, the simple majority becomes the preferred threshold if the relative
advantage of winning (1=Rj) is higher than the relative probability of losing when the
simple majority threshold is set up.6 In other words, if Pr fWg is only slightly lower
than Pr fLg, and winning generates high benets compared to the cost of losing, the
agent prefers to give up the highest protection of unanimity in favor of the lowest
protection given by the bare majority threshold.
So far we have seen that a corner solution (i.e. the bare majority or the unanimity)
emerges when (8) is not satised, whereas an internal solution (a super-majority) may
emerge if (8) holds. In both cases, however, the agent prefers a low threshold when Rj
is su¢ ciently low. In other words, if the advantages from winning are su¢ ciently high
compared to the cost of losing, the agent asks for low protection from the majority
tyranny, because this also implies increasing the chance of winning. Observe that
Rj is low not only when the favorable outcome is relatively high compared to the
unfavorable one, but also when, given gains and losses, uj is rather convex or not
highly concave. Thus, for any W , S and L, Rj decreases if the agents risk aversion
decreases.7. This positive relation between risk aversion and the preferred threshold
is one of the two theoretical predictions that we test with our experiment.
An additional prediction to be validated concerns the role of the subjective prob-
ability p, capturing the agents degree of condence about how the other agents will
vote. In this case, the intuition provided by the theoretical model is straightforward.
Higher p means that the agent considers winning relatively more likely; thus, other
6The relative probability of losing is 1 xjxj , where xj is the probability of winning when the
simple majority threshold is set up. Given that j is uncondent (i.e. she thinks that winning is less
likely than loosing), it is 1 xjxj > 1.
7Note that all lotteries over three xed prizes can be represented in the 2-dimensional Machina-
Marschak triangle. The slope of indi¤erence curves on this domain is exactly Rj and, indeed, the
more risk averse agent j is, the steeper the indi¤erence curves are (see Machina (1987) for details).
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things being equal, she fears losing less and prefers lower protection. In this case,
she wants to facilitate majority formation, because, for any q, a favorable majority
has become more probable; thus, she wants a lower threshold.8
Notice that the e¤ect of p on the preferred threshold is independent of the agents
risk aversion. In fact, our model predicts that if a condent agent (p > 0:5 ) and an
uncondent agent (p < 0:5  ) have the same ratio R in (7), the preferred threshold
of the former is never higher, i.e. less risky.9
We test the negative e¤ect of agentscondence on the preferred majority thresh-
olds in two di¤erent settings. In the rst treatment, we measure condence by simply
asking uninformed agents to state their genuine priors about the distribution of oth-
ersvotes over the two alternatives. In the second treatment, we study how the e¤ects
of condence change when agents, before stating their preferred majority thresholds,
privately observe a signal about the (exogenous) distribution of votes over policies.
5 Experimental Results
Overall, we run three sessions of the NO-INFO treatment and two sessions of the
INFO treatment. Each session of the NO-INFO treatment involved 31 subjects,
while each session of the INFO treatment involved 35 subjects. Each subject could
only participate in one of these sessions. The sessions were run at the EELAB,
University of Milan - Bicocca, in 2008 and at the Bocconi University, Milan, in 2009.
Each session lasted around one hour and subjects earned on average 12.59 euros
plus 3.00 euros of show-up fee. The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree
software (Fischbacher, 2007).
5.1 The NO-INFO treatment
Table 1 reports the distribution of subjectschoices in the rst phase of the exper-
iment. More than 78% of subjects choose a pair of lotteries included between the
11th and the 20th line, with the median choice being the 16th. Thus, as in other
experiments,10 we observe the majority of subjects exhibiting risk aversion.
8Let us sketch the proof of this intuition: if p increses, q0 in (6) decreases if it is a maximum,
and it increases if it is a minimum; in both cases, the agents prefers a (weakly) lower threshold.
9For example, if R ! 0+, both agents choose the simple majority. If R ! 1 , the condent
agent chooses the simple majority, while the uncondent chooses unanimity. The same happens
if R = 1. Finally, if R 2 (1;+1), then the condent agent chooses either a qualied majority or
unanimity, while the uncondent chooses unanimity.
10See Carlsson et al. (2002) and Harrison and Rutström (2008).
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Table 1. Distribution of Risk Preferences in NO-INFO
Category N F (x)
rho   2:863 1 1 0:011
2 0 0:011
3 0 0:011
4 1 0:022
5 0 0:022
6 3 0:054
7 0 0:054
8 2 0:075
9 5 0:129
 0:112  rho  0:038 10 8 0:215
11 2 0:237
12 1 0:247
13 5 0:301
14 4 0:344
15 10 0:452
16 19 0:656
17 13 0:796
18 6 0:860
19 8 0:946
rho  1:613 20 5 1:000
Note. This table reports the distribution of subjects risk prefer-
ences in NO-INFO and the correspondent cumulative distribution
function. For a given answer, rho refers to the estimated interval
of the risk aversion parameter as obtained by using a CRRA utility
function.
Moving to the second phase of the experiment, we start from analyzing subjects
guesses about the distribution between x type and y type voters. Given that,
for each subject, both types have the same probability and the random draws are
independent for all subjects, a rational subject should always show moderate
condence, i.e. 1+ W   L = 1: In other words, a rationalsubject should always
expect the rest of the population being equally splitted over the two alternatives.
Thus, knowing her type, she should always expect probability of winning being mod-
erately higher than probability of loosing. We dene over-condent a subject who
states a distribution of the other subjectsvotes that is biased in favour of her type,
i.e. 1 + W   L > 1. Therefore, according to their guess in the second phase of
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the experiment, we split the subjects into two subsets: condent and uncondent
ones. The subset of condent subjects is composed by those being moderately con-
dent (and so rational) and those being over-condent, according to the denitions
above. A rationalsubject expects that n=2 + 1 subjects in her session (including
herself) will be of her type. Therefore, we built for each subject a measure of con-
dence dened as the di¤erence between the number of voters she expects to have
her own type and n=2 + 1. The distribution of this measure of condence is shown
in gure 1.
Observe that the modal guess is rational(n=2 + 1), whereas around 58% of sub-
jects exhibit over-condence. A binomial test strongly rejects the null hypothesis
of equal distribution between condent and uncondent subjects either by consid-
ering or excluding the rationalones (p-value < 0:01). According to a Spearman
correlation test, we nd no signicant correlation between risk aversion (as prox-
ied by the subjects choice in the rst phase) and her condence. This holds both
by considering the measure of condence introduced above (rho = 0:082, p-value
= 0:432) and by using a dummy variable that assumes value one if the subject is
condent (rho =  0:027, p-value = 0:792; considering only the over-condent ones,
rho = 0:090, p-value = 0:389).
Result 1. The majority of subjects exhibit risk aversion and report over-condent
guesses. There is not signicant correlation between the degree of risk aversion
and condence.
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Let us now look at the preferred majority thresholds. Table 2 reports the distri-
bution of subjectschoices about thresholds in the second phase of the experiment.
Table 2. Distribution of Majority Thresholds in NO-INFO
Majority Threshold N F (x)
16 8 0:086
17 2 0:108
18 5 0:161
19 4 0:204
20 3 0:237
21 2 0:258
22 10 0:366
23 8 0:452
24 7 0:527
25 7 0:602
26 4 0:645
27 9 0:742
28 3 0:774
29 1 0:785
30 3 0:817
31 17 1:000
Note. This table reports the distribution majority thresholds chosen
by subjects in the rst part of the second phase of the NO-INFO
treatment and the correspondent cumulative distribution function.
The median preferred threshold is 24 (in percentage, around 77%), while the modal
threshold is unanimity. The rst column of table 3 reports results from a Tobit model
in which the chosen majority thresholds are regressed on individual degrees of risk
aversion and two dummies, one for rationality and the other for over-condence. The
majority thresholds are positively and highly correlated with subjectsdegree of risk
aversion (the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk Aversion is 0:499 and it is signicant at the
1% level). This result is conrmed by non-parametric tests. Indeed, according to a
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, the majority thresholds chosen by subjects exhibiting
risk aversion are signicantly higher than those chosen by risk lovers (p-value =
0:012). As for the condence, the coe¢ cients of both dummies are negative and only
the one reecting over-condence is highly signicant.
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Table 3. Tobit Models in NO-INFO and INFO
Dependent Variable: (1) (2)
Majority Threshold
Explanatory Variables:
Risk Aversion 0:499 1:027
(0:164) (0:218)
Rationality  2:409  1:522
(3:014) (1:971)
Over-Condence  2:742  1:183
(1:313) (1:894)
Net Favorable Signal  0:803
(0:356)
Constant 19:185 13:132
(2:555) (3:416)
N. Obs. 93 70
Log-pseudolikelihood  242:946  182:396
F-test 4:38 6:96
Prob>F 0:006 0:000
Notes. This table reports coe¢ cient estimates (robust standard er-
rors in parentheses) from Tobit models for both the NO-INFO and
INFO treatment. The dependent variable is given by the majority
thresholds chosen by subjects in the rst part of the second phase of
the experiment. Risk Aversion is given by subjectschoices in the rst
part of the experiment. Rationality and Over-Condence are dum-
mies assuming value one if, in the second part of the second phase
of the experiment, a subject reported rational or over-optimistic
guesses respectively. For a given signal received by a subject in the
second phase of the INFO treatment, Net Favorable Signal is the dif-
ference between the number of voters of her own type and the number
of voters of the other type in her observed subset of seven subjects. *,
** and *** denote statistical signicance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level,
respectively.
Thus, after controlling for the degree of risk aversion, over-condent subjects
choose majority thresholds that are signicantly lower than the thresholds chosen
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by the uncondent ones. This evidence and the non signicant correlation between
condence and risk aversion discussed above support the theoretical insights of our
model. In fact, the theoretical model predicts that a condent subject with a given
degree of risk aversion will never choose a higher threshold than an uncondent one
with same degree of risk aversion. This is due to the assumption that risk aversion
and condence are independent idiosyncratic features in our model.
Result 2. Subjects prefer super-majority thresholds. Subjectspreferences strongly
depend on behavioral characteristics. In particular, majority thresholds are
positively correlated with risk aversion and negatively correlated with condence.
5.2 The INFO treatment
Table 4 shows the distribution of subjectschoices in the rst phase of the experiment.
Table 4. Distribution of Risk Preferences in INFO
Category N F (x)
rho   2:863 1 1 0:014
2 0 0:014
3 0 0:014
4 1 0:028
5 0 0:028
6 0 0:028
7 1 0:043
8 2 0:071
9 1 0:085
 0:112  rho  0:038 10 5 0:157
11 9 0:285
12 1 0:300
13 4 0:357
14 2 0:385
15 9 0:514
16 14 0:714
17 8 0:828
18 2 0:857
19 5 0:928
rho  1:613 20 5 1:000
Note. This table reports the distribution of subjectsrisk preferences
in INFO and the correspondent cumulative distribution function.
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Similarly to the NO-INFO treatment, the median choice in the rst phase of the
experiment is line 16. More than 84% of subjects exhibit risk aversion. We do not
nd any signicant di¤erence between treatments in the risk parameter (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0:607).
Consider now the second phase of the experiment. Recall that, in the INFO
treatment, before choosing the majority threshold and stating her guess, each subject
observed the distribution of x type and y type voters in a subset of seven subjects.
In order to classify subjects as condent or uncondent, we must combine subjects
stated guesses with the informative content of their private signal. First, for each
subject, we built a theoretical distribution by rescaling the number of xs and ys in
the private signal to the size of the subject pool. Then, we built for each subject a
new measure of condence dened as the di¤erence between the number of voters
she expects to have her own type and the predicted number obtained by rescaling
the private signal she received. Figure 2 reports the distribution of this new measure
of condence.
As shown by the graph, 36% of subjects reported rational guesses, while 41%
exhibited over-condence. We built a dummy assuming value one if the subject is
rational, a dummy assuming value one if the subject exhibits over-condence and
a dummy assuming value one in case of uncondence. Recall that in this treatment a
rationalsubject should rescale the distribution of the signal she privately received
to the size of the subject pool. Accordingly, over-condence means that the subjects
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guess on the number of voters of her own type is strictly larger than the predicted
number inferred by rescaling the signal. As shown in table 5, although the population
is equally splitted between those observing a favorable signal and those receiving an
unfavorable one, a binomial test rejects the null hypothesis of an equal distribution
between condent and uncondent subjects. This is true both by including (p-value
= 0:000) and by excluding (p-value = 0:072) the rational subjects amongst the
condent ones.
Table 5. Over-Condent, Rational and Uncondent subjects in INFO
Favorable Signal
Measure of Condence > 0 < 0 N
> 0 9 20 29
= 0 13 12 25
< 0 13 3 16
N 35 35 70
p-valuea 0:175 0:000 0:000
p-valueb 0:523 0:000 0:072
Note. This table reports the distribution of Over-Condent, Rationaland Uncon-
dent subjects in INFO cross-tabulated with the information contained in their signals.
The table also reports results from a binomial test for the null hypothesis of an equal
distribution between Condent and Uncondent subjects either by including (a) or
by excluding (b) from the rst category those reporting rationalguesses.
By considering only subjects observing an unfavorable signal, there is a clear ten-
dency towards over-condence (20 subjects out of 35 report over-condent guesses,
while only 3 show uncondence), conrming the tendency in the NO-INFO treat-
ment. Interestingly, a di¤erent picture emerges when we focus on those observing
a favorable signal. In this case, the proportion of over-condent subjects is slightly
smaller than the uncondent ones (9 vs 13). However, the proportion of subjects
being rationalis almost the same that we nd when the signal is unfavorable. We
have an intuitive interpretation for this evidence. Suppose that, when asked to state
her prior without observing any signal, a subject is genuinely over-condent (i.e.
over-condent according to the measure dened for NO-INFO). If we let this subject
observe a favorable private signal, then she tempersher over-condence and shows
herself as rational (according to the measure dened for INFO). If instead she
observes an unfavorable signal, her genuine over-condence prevails. Although the
opposite happens for genuinely uncondent subjects, this e¤ect is less evident, given
the relative small number of these subjects.
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Similarly to the NO-INFO treatment, risk aversion is not signicantly correlated
to condence. This is true both if we consider the measure of condence introduced
for the INFO treatment (rho = 0:122, p-value = 0:315) and by using a dummy
variable with value one when a subject exhibits condence (rho = 0:093, p-value
= 0:442; considering only the over-condent ones, it is rho = 0:164, p-value = 0:279).
Result 3. More than one third of subjects react to the private signal by rationally
updating their guesses about the others types. A large proportion of subjects
continue to exhibit over-condence.
Consider now the rst part of the second phase of the experiment. Table 6
reports the distribution of subjectschoices about thresholds. The modal choice is
unanimity; the second most preferred threshold is the simple majority.
Table 6. Distribution of Majority Thresholds in INFO
Majority Threshold N F (x)
18 9 0:129
19 0 0:129
20 3 0:171
21 4 0:229
22 5 0:300
23 4 0:357
24 2 0:386
25 5 0:457
26 4 0:514
27 5 0:586
28 1 0:600
29 2 0:629
30 6 0:714
31 2 0:743
32 3 0:786
33 3 0:829
34 0 0:829
35 12 1:000
Note. This table reports the distribution majority thresholds chosen
by subjects in the rst part of the second phase of the INFO treat-
ment as well as the correspondent cumulative distribution function.
In the second column of table 3, we present results from a Tobit model that regresses
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the majority threshold chosen by a subject on the same set of explanatory variables
used for the NO-INFO treatment and on Net Favorable Signal. This variable is de-
ned, given the signal that a subject receives, as the di¤erence between the number
of voters of her own type and the number of voters of the other type in her observed
subset of seven subjects. As before, the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk Aversion is pos-
itive and highly signicant. Interestingly, neither Over-Condence nor Rationality
are signicant while Net Favorable Signal is highly signicant. Thus, the private sig-
nal tends to replace (or at least has a stronger impact than) subjects over-condence
in determining the preferred majority threshold.
Result 4 In the INFO treatment, there is a positive and highly signicant correlation
between subjects preferred majority threshold and her degree of risk aversion.
Moreover, the private signal replaces the inuence of her over-condence in
determining her preferred majority threshold.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that the fear of being subject to a majority tyranny leads
an individual to prefer more demanding majority thresholds. In accordance to the
theoretical prediction, our experimental results show that the level of the preferred
majority threshold depends on the voters risk aversion and on subjective priors
about how others will vote. Therefore, a more risk averse and a less condent agent
may fear more being tyrannized by an unfavorable majority, thus asking for higher
super-majorities.
These ndings have important implications for the design of the optimal voting
system, which have been neglected by the literature so far.11 As a major expression
of a systems democracy, the design of voting institutions should account, among
other things, for citizenspreferences regarding the threshold required in order to
determine the winning majority.
It is also worth observing that, while risk aversion is intrinsically related to an
individuals perception of private gains and losses, lack of condence reects an
individuals perception about how own preferences may di¤er from the others. Lack
of condence may derive from the feeling of being di¤erent in ideology, needs, desires,
vision of the world. This is particularly important in collective situations, such as
11With one notable exception by Procaccia and Segal (2003) analyzing how a constitution is
drafted by people that behave according to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)).
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voting. An uncondent individual may think that the majority is di¤erent from
herself and consequently she does not want the majority to easily make decisions
that will a¤ect her. Thus, over-condence is a behavioral distortion that possibly
a¤ects the calculus of the threshold. In fact, we nd that naively over-condent
individuals signicantly prefer lower thresholds. As soon as agents receive a private
signal according to which others are more likely to vote in a favorable way, naive
over-condence is replaced by the signal. Thus, the preferred thresholds are fully
determined by the signal, rather than by votersnaive priors. Our ndings are in
line with the existing literature on the role of exit polls and pre-voting information
on agentschoice. However, while previous experimental works focus on the role of
exit polls on voting behavior, our paper sheds light on their relevance for agents
preferences on the voting rules.
Of course, protection comes at the cost of lower chance to overcome the status
quo in a favorable way. One might argue that this individual trade o¤ between risk
of tyranny and chance of being part of a favorable majority reects the trade o¤ at
collective level between decisiveness of the voting rules and the need of protecting
minorities. In this paper we have not answered the question of which threshold will
be chosen at the constitutional level, and whether it is sociallyoptimal or not. We
think, however, that our ndings contribute to answer important normative issues
such as: how do voting rules reect the risk attitudes of citizens where crucial policy
issues are concerned? What kind of protection do agents demand when they belong
to an ethnic minority or when they think that their policy preferences are di¤erent
from the bulk of the population? What degree of conict on decisional rules should
we expect within a constituency whose members have diversied preferences? How
many super-majority thresholds should a statute include, and for which issues?
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Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welcome to the experimental laboratory of _____________ University of _____________ .  
Thank you for participating in this experimental session. By carefully following the instructions 
described below, you can earn an amount of Euros that will be paid in cash at the end of the session.  
 
The choices and the earnings of each participant will remain anonymous throughout the session. 
This means that no participant in this session will receive any information about the choices and the 
earnings of the other participants. 
 
During the session, it is not allowed to speak or to communicate in any other way with the other 
participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the lab assistants will 
come to answer your questions privately. 
 
All the following rules are the same for all participants. 
 
 
 
 
General rules 
 
This experimental session consists of two consecutive phases.  
 
Only one of the two phases will be used to determine your final earnings. In particular, the phase 
used to determine your earnings will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment, by flipping a 
coin. Thus, each of the two phases has a probability of 50% to be chosen for payment. 
 
In a few seconds, we will distribute the instructions for Phase 1. 
 
The instructions for Phase 2 will be distributed at the end of Phase 1. 
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Phase 1 
 
 
Your task in this phase. 
 
Please take a look at Table 1. Table 1 describes 19 pairs of lotteries, with each pair corresponding to 
different Line. Each pair consists of two lotteries, called A (left column) and B (right column). For 
each lottery of a pair, the table indicates the monetary outcomes as well as the attached probabilities 
expressed in terms of tickets. Notice that, within each pair of lotteries, the number of the tickets 
assigned to the higher and to the lower monetary outcome is the same. Within each pair, the only 
difference between lottery A and lottery B is in the monetary earnings:  
- in lottery A, the higher monetary outcome is 12.00 euros and the lower is 10.00 euros; 
- in lottery B, the higher monetary outcome is 22.00 euros and the lower is   0.50 euros.  
 
You have to indicate from which pair of lotteries you prefer taking part to lottery B rather than to 
lottery A. In other words, in your computer screen you have to select a Line number from L1 to 
L20, such that: 
- for all the pairs above the line you have chosen, you prefer lottery A to lottery B;  
- for the line you have chosen and for all the lines below, you prefer lottery B to lottery A. 
Notice that selecting line L1 means that you prefer lottery B to lottery A for all the 19 pairs, while 
selecting the last (empty) line L20 means that you prefer lottery A to lottery B for all the 19 pairs. 
 
At the end of the experiment, in case phase 1 will be randomly selected for payment, the earnings 
will be determined as follows.  
 
First, for each participant, the computer will randomly select a pair of lotteries. Given the pair of 
lotteries the computer will select for you, your choice will be used to determine which lottery you 
will participate. At this point, an experimenter will randomly draw one of the 20 tickets. The 
selected ticket will be the winning ticket and it will be the same for all the participants. 
 
 
Example 
 
For all the pairs of lotteries from L1 to L6, John prefers lottery A to lottery B, while he prefers 
lottery B to lottery A for all the pairs from L7 to L19. For this reason, John chooses L7. At the end 
of the experiment, phase 1 is randomly selected for payment. Suppose that the computer selects the 
pair L10 for John. Given his choice, for L10 John prefers lottery B to lottery A. At this point, we 
randomly draw one of the 20 tickets. If the number of the selected ticket is between 1 and 10, John 
receives 22.00 euros; if the number of the selected ticket is between 11 and 20, John receives 0.50 
euros. 
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Table 1 
 
The following table shows 19 pairs of Lotteries, called A and B respectively. 
 
 LOTTERY A LOTTERY B 
L1 
 
If the selected ticket is no. 1, you win 12.00 euros; if the 
selected ticket is between 2 and 20, you win 10.00 euros. 
 
 
If the selected ticket is no. 1, you win 22.00 euros; if the 
selected ticket is between 2 and 20, you win 0.50 euros. 
 
L2 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 2, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 3 and 20, you win 
10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 2, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 3 and 20, you win 
0.50 euros. 
L3 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 3, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 4 and 20, you win 
10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 3, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 4 and 20, you win 
0.50 euros. 
L4 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 4, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 5 and 20, you win 
10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 4, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 5 and 20, you win 
0.50 euros. 
L5 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 5, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 6 and 20, you win 
10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 5, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 6 and 20, you win 
0.50 euros. 
L6 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 6, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 7 and 20, you win 
10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 6, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 7 and 20, you win 
0.50 euros. 
L7 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 7, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 8 and 20, you win 
10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 7, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 8 and 20, you win 
0.50 euros. 
L8 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 8, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 9 and 20, you win 
10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 8, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 9 and 20, you win 
0.50 euros. 
L9 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 9, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 10 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 9, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 10 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L10 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 10, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 11 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 10, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 11 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L11 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 11, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 12 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 11, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 12 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L12 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 12, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 13 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 12, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 13 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L13 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 13, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 14 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 13, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 14 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L14 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 14, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 15 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 14, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 15 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L15 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 15, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 16 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 15, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 16 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L16 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 16, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 17 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 16, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 17 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L17 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 17, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 18 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 17, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 18 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L18 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 18, you win 12.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 19 and 20, you 
win 10.00 euros. 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 18, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is between 19 and 20, you 
win 0.50 euros. 
L19 If the selected ticket is between 1 and 19, you win 12.00 euros; if the selected ticket is no. 20, you win 10.00 euros 
 
If the selected ticket is between 1 and 19, you win 22.00 
euros; if the selected ticket is no. 20, you win 0.50 euros. 
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Phase 2 
 
This phase consists of two parts. The instructions of the second part will be distributed at the end of 
the first part. 
 
 
 
 
Part 1 of phase 2 
 
Your task in part 1 of phase 2. 
 
In this part of phase 2, you will be involved in the voting over two alternatives, X and Y.  
 
You have to choose the majority threshold required to determine the winning alternative, knowing 
that: 
 
[NO-INFO Treatment] 
 
• there are 31 participants in this session. Each participant counts for one vote only. Thus, the 
majority threshold you have to choose must be included between 16 votes (the simple majority) 
and 31 votes (the unanimity). 
• the vote of each participant is randomly (with equal probability) and anonymously assigned by 
the computer to one of the two alternatives. For each participant there is a separate random 
draw. Before choosing the majority threshold, you will be informed about which alternative 
you support. However, you will not observe the alternative voted by any of the other 
participants, which could be X or Y with equal probability. 
 
[INFO Treatment] 
 
• there are 35 participants in this session. Each participant counts for one vote only. Thus, the 
majority threshold you have to choose must be included between 18 votes (the simple majority) 
and 35 votes (the unanimity). 
• the vote of each participant is randomly (with equal probability) and anonymously assigned by 
the computer to one of the two alternatives. For each participant there is a separate random 
draw. Before choosing the majority threshold, you will be informed about which alternative 
you support. However, you will not observe the alternative voted by any of the other 
participants, which could be X or Y with equal probability. 
• before choosing the majority threshold, each participant will be shown the number of votes in 
favor of X and the number of votes in favor of Y in a subgroup of 7 participants randomly 
selected by the computer for her. 
 
 
At the end of the experiment, in case phase 2 will be randomly selected for payment, the earnings of 
this part will be determined as follows.  
 
If the number of votes in favor of the alternative you support is greater than or equal to the majority 
threshold you have chosen, then you get 22.00 euros.  
If the number of votes in favor of the alternative you do not support is greater than or equal to the 
majority threshold you have chosen, then you get 0.00 euros.  
If neither of the two alternatives receives a number of votes at least equal to the majority threshold 
you have chosen, then you get 11.00 euros. 
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Example 
 
The computer randomly assigns John’s vote to alternative X.  
 
[NO-INFO Treatment] 
 
John chooses a majority threshold of 21 votes (out of 31) required to determine the winning 
alternative between X and Y. At the end of the experiment, phase 2 is randomly selected for 
payment. If the number of votes in favor of the alternative X is greater than or equal to 21, then 
John gets 22.00 euros. If the number of votes in favor of the alternative Y is greater than or equal to 
21, then John gets 0.00 euros. If neither of the two alternatives receives at least 21 votes, John gets 
11.00 euros. 
 
[INFO Treatment] 
 
Moreover, in the subgroup of 7 participants randomly selected by the computer for John, 5 votes are 
for alternative X and 2 votes are for alternative Y. 
John chooses a majority threshold of 21 votes (out of 35) required to determine the winning 
alternative between X and Y. At the end of the experiment, phase 2 is randomly selected for 
payment. If the number of votes in favor of the alternative X is greater than or equal to 21, then 
John gets 22.00 euros. If the number of votes in favor of the alternative Y is greater than or equal to 
21, then John gets 0.00 euros. If neither of the two alternatives receives at least 21 votes, John gets 
11.00 euros. 
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Part 2 of phase 2 
 
 
Your task in part 2 of phase 2. 
 
[NO-INFO treatment] 
 
In this part of phase 2, you have to guess the number of votes for alternative X and the number of 
votes for alternative Y, with the sum of these numbers being equal to 31, namely to the total number 
of participants in the session. 
 
[INFO treatment] 
 
In this part of phase 2, you have to guess the number of votes for alternative X and the number of 
votes for alternative Y, with the sum of these numbers being equal to 35, namely to the total number 
of participants in the session. 
 
 
 
At the end of the experiment, in case phase 2 will be randomly selected for payment, the earnings of 
this part will be determined as follows.  
 
If your guesses match the number of votes randomly assigned to alternative X and Y respectively, 
then 3.00 euros will be added to your earnings from part 1 of phase 2. 
